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 Introduction 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s first term in office is drawing to its close. Few people seri-
ously question his chances for re-election. At the same time, the upcoming elections are a good 
time to look at the results of economic development over the last four years.  
We have clearly seen significant positive change in Russia since 1999. This change is especially 
obvious when compared to the crisis-ridden 1990ies. Strong GDP growth and a stable budget 
surplus, repayment of arrears in the social sphere, growing real household incomes and regular 
sovereign debt payments are all features of the relative economic stability we have seen over the 
last few years. Many experts admit, however, that this success can be attributed to the 1998 
devaluation of the rouble and high oil prices rather than to an intelligent and focused approach 
adopted by the government. Commodity industries have maintained and even increased their 
share in the GDP and export structure, which inevitably led to an extreme dependence of the 
Russian economy on world oil prices. As a result, the weakening devaluation effect and an 
abrupt, though temporary, decline in oil prices caused the economic growth to slow down sub-
stantially by the end of 2001.1 These negative trends were superimposed on the general feeling 
of a hiatus in institutional reform and of an approaching stagnation.2 
Under these circumstances, the government’s attempt to include the declining GDP growth rate 
in the mid-term economic development forecast in spring 2002 triggered public criticism by the 
President’s Administration and by President Putin personally. It also generated a new wave of 
discussions among economists on the future of the Russian economy.3 The fact that such discus-
sions take place indicates that the expert community has a sound evaluation of the current situa-
tion. It can be regarded as a positive step forward – nothing of the kind was happening before 
the 1998 devaluation and default. The President indirectly reacted to these discussions in his 
address to the Federal Assembly in May 2003 by stating the need to double the GDP during the 
next 10 years and to carry out administrative reform. In addition, the need to ‘diversify the 
economy’ was declared in the new short-term program developed by the government. 
The problem both with expert discussions of late 2002 – early 2003 and with new government 
documents is a focus on old questions of what kind of reform Russia really needs. In our opin-
ion, this topic has been exhausted – almost all possible recipes have already been formulated.4 
Since President Putin took office, we have seen clearly that we need to find out not only what is 
to be done but also who can support and carry out the proposed reforms and how they can be 
implemented. This paper focuses on the question of who can support reforms. 
It consists of two sections. The first section analyses the main findings of previous studies; it 
highlights the questions that have not been answered and looks at the trends that, in our view, 
have not been properly explained. The second section discusses the evolution of interests of 
influential social groups in the post-reform period, shows the positive influence of the 1998 
financial crisis on economic agents’ motivation and explains why the key players subsequently 
                                                     
1 According to Goskomstat, the Russian State Committee for Statistics, in the first six months of 2003 industrial 
production again grew at 6.8% per annum (as compared to the first six months of 2002). This, however, just pospones 
the problems without actually resolving them since there are still no stable sources of economic growth. 
2 This is reflected in people's deteriorating expectations with regard to economic development – for more information 
see changes in the VTsIOM ‘social attitude index’ (ISN) and the behaviour of some of its components since spring 
2002.  
3 See Expert Institute report ‘Burden of the State’, Egor Gaidar’s presentation at IET Scientific Council meeting in 
February 2003, HSE report ‘Russia: Creation of New Economy Institutions’, etc. 
4 As concluded by E.G. Yasin in his article “State Burden and Economic Policy (Liberal Alternative)” in Voprosy 
Ekonomiki, issue 11 of 2002: “Most of the proposed measures are not new. They were proposed at different stages of 
market transformation but were never implemented for different reasons”. 
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lost development incentives. In the conclusion some groups are identified on this basis that are 
able to support a policy of reforms under the present conditions aimed at implementing com-
petitive institutions and mechanisms in the economic and political spheres. The conclusion also 
describes some approaches to generating a positive influence on the motivation of those groups. 
Who needs reform: analysis techniques  
and current state of research 
It must be pointed out that this topic is not new for Russian or foreign researchers. Analysis of 
the social basis of reform is an interdisciplinary problem that involves economists, political and 
social scientists.  
We believe two major areas are important in studies of the social basis for reform. In the first 
area we look at activities and policies of those social groups that really win or lose as a result of 
the reform. Here we have room both for political economy-related theoretical speculation and 
for empiric sociological research. The second area looks more at who really manages the reform 
process, how the composition of the top social layers changes during transition to the market. 
Normally, such elite studies are done in between political science and sociology. 
In the next two sub-sections we will briefly describe the main results for both areas in the 
1990s; in the closing sub-section of this section we will discuss the recent trends identified in 
Russian and foreign literature.  
The winners and the losers 
The goal to identify the winners and the losers in the reform process has been set in many socio-
logical studies.5 The estimates were based both on the respondents’ answers to direct questions 
on reform advantages and disadvantages for them and on their answers to indirect questions 
characterizing changes in respondents’ living standards, in their attitudes to politics, etc. In 
some cases one can even talk about sufficiently long timelines devoted to this topic. Empiric 
data is, of course, very important; however, we believe that to understand the processes that 
took place it is more important to look at the models on which explanations of social interac-
tions in transitional economies were based in different periods and which sometimes had a very 
significant impact on reform policy. 
For a long time, the so-called J-curve model was one of the most popular models in political 
science literature.6 According to this model (see Figure 1), such benefits as a lower inflation, 
higher efficiency and competitiveness of organizations, etc. are postponed in time and dispersed 
in space. All members of a society benefit from macroeconomic stability and better economic 
performance. For this reason, it is difficult to identify those who would be most interested in 
reform effectiveness. The positive effect of the reforms becomes visible only after the decline 
related to transformation. The disadvantages, on the contrary, predominantly affect certain so-
cial groups (employees of former state-owned organizations, old nomenklatura, pensioners, the 
unemployed) concurrently with the reforms. 
The J-curve model is based on the assumption that in a democracy, social groups likely to be 
affected by the upcoming reform may try to hamper the reform process and cause the reformist 
government to withdraw from power. It was believed, therefore, that in practice radical reforms 
can only be carried out by an ‘autonomous’ government which does not depend on its voters in 
the short term and is supported by international financial institutions. Since any ‘autonomy’ of 
                                                     
5 See VTsIOM, RNISiPN and other think tanks’ projects.  
6 See Williamson (1994), Nelson (1990), and other papers.  
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this kind is inevitably limited in time, the key reforms need to be carried out as quickly as pos-
sible to make sure that the process is irreversible even after a new government takes office. This 
concept formed to a large extent the basis of the ‘shock therapy’ policy implemented in many 
economies in transition in the early 1990ies.  
















Actual development, however, was significantly different from what was predicted by this 
model. As Joel Hellman showed in his well-known paper,7 economic reform was most success-
ful in countries where the governments depended more on the voters. Countries with ‘autono-
mous’ governments, on the contrary, showed either lack of real reform or inconsistent, ‘partial’ 
reforms. And it was in the case of ‘partial’ reforms that there were high transformation-related 
costs (expressed in faster GDP decline, lower living standards, and social stratification) on the 
one hand, and no anticipated positive results able to stimulate economic activity on the other. 
Some economies would freeze in the state of ‘partial’, incomplete reform. And even countries 
where no reform had been carried out would be better off.  
Joel Hellman tried to explain this phenomenon with his ‘partial reform’ model. He proposed 
that reforms in the short term can provide both disadvantages and advantages to certain social 
groups. The fact that in the beginning different reforms produced results at different points in 
time and were not implemented consistently can increase further the structural deformations 
typical of a command economy. As a result, it becomes possible for some social groups (such as 
managers of old state-owned enterprises, managers of new commercial banks, trade companies, 
etc.) to perform efficient arbitration transactions between the regulated and market-driven sec-
tors of the economy.  
The higher the distortion caused by inconsistency and lack of integrity in the implementation of 
reforms, the more benefits influential social groups can gain from such arbitration transactions 
and, consequently, the higher their ability to obstruct the reform process in the future and to 
                                                     
7 See Hellman (1998). 
Period of transition 
Time 
Consumption 
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preserve their rent sources. As a result we can see the partial reform ‘trap’ effect.8 The above 
said is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Hellman’s main conclusion is that the problem is not to protect the reformist government from 
the influence of the ‘losing’ social groups but to limit the ability of the influential ‘winning’ 
groups to put pressure on the government in an attempt to keep their rent sources. According to 
Hellman, one of the main solutions to this problem is development of a political democracy that 
takes into account the ‘losers’’ opinion and contains pressure exerted by the ‘winning’ social 
groups. 
Hellman’s paper was logically extended by a presentation on the phenomenon of privatization 
or state capture presented at the ABCDE conference in April 2000.9 By state capture the authors 
of the presentation mean the possibility for companies to influence the basic rules of the game 
expressed in laws, regulations, decrees and resolutions by making informal payments to offi-
cials or policy-makers. The paper based on a survey of 3,000 enterprises in 20 economies in 
transition conducted in 1999 showed the scale of state capture, the negative impact of this phe-
nomenon on economic development, and its close relation with ‘partial’ reforms.  

















Wp – the ‘winners’ curve in the conditions of partial reform 
Wc – the ‘winners’ curve in the conditions of comprehensive reform 
Lc – the ‘losers’ curve in the conditions of comprehensive reform 
Lp – the ‘losers’ curve in the conditions of partial reform 
 
                                                     
8 In Russian literature the ‘institutional trap’ problem was considered in details by Polterovich (1998). 







Consumption level before the 
beginning of the transition period 
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Hellman clearly shows in his papers the reformers’ dependence on the economic and political 
environment and, therefore, convincingly criticizes the ‘autonomous government’ concept 
which was an important condition for implementing a policy based on the ‘Washington consen-
sus’ principles. It can be pointed out that a detailed and thorough analysis of this concept based 
on Russian data was done by S. Afontsev.10 One of his conclusions is the need to choose the 
most economically efficient option out of a number of politically acceptable reform scenarios – 
rather than orientation towards an ‘economically ideal’ course of reforms. 
Hellman, in our view, lacks this realism when he formulates political recommendations. He 
suggests that democratic development is one of the main ways to overcome dependence on 
those influential groups that benefit from ‘partial’ reforms. With all their differences from the J-
curve, Hellman’s arguments point out the need for accelerated and comprehensive reform since 
this results in smaller initial distortions which can be eliminated much faster. We do not know, 
however, why some countries choose more comprehensive and consistent reform programs 
while others only carry out partial reforms from the very beginning (pressure from the ‘win-
ning’ social groups can explain why one cannot get out of the partial reform trap but not why 
one got into it). Besides, it is not clear who and why is going to support the development of 
political democracy and make sure the reforms are consistent in the post-privatization environ-
ment. 
Another model that explains the differences in results obtained in different economies in transi-
tion was proposed by Timothy Frye.11 What makes this model different is that it uses GDP 
changes (the ultimate output of reforms), and not implementation or pace of reform, as the de-
pendent variable.  
Frye’s final conclusion is that the degree of polarization of the political elite has a significant 
impact on economic development. By polarization he means strong opposition of anticommun-
ists and ex-communists,12 which does not give any group the ability to shift transformation costs 
completely to their opponents and to wholly implement their reform scenario. This affects the 
economic environment. At the same time polarization generates expectations of government 
reshuffle and changes in political course, including possible revision by the new government of 
decisions made by their predecessors and political opponents with regard to distribution of 
property rights. Therefore, polarization undermines confidence in emerging institutions and 
policies pursued by the government and limits the horizon of business projects. 
This approach complements Joel Hellman’s model by suggesting political polarization as one of 
the reasons why a specific country may find itself in the unstable equilibrium of ‘partial re-
forms’. Besides, this model explains political business cycles in economies in transition where, 
unlike in most democratic countries, economic growth slows down before elections.13 Frye’s 
model, however, does not show why political polarization takes place in some countries but is 
not observed in others. Nor does it show how to handle this polarization.  
Transformation of the elites 
Increased attention (especially in the early 1990s) to the problem discussed in this sub-section 
was caused by the fact that it is elites that build new institutions. A number of empiric studies 
                                                     
10 See Afontsev, 2000а.  
11 See Frye, 2002а. 
12 T. Frye measures the polarization degree by the proportion of ex-communist parties in parliament when an anti-
communist government is at power and vice-versa. 
13 According to T. Frye, this is caused by increasing political risks which affect business activity.  
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were devoted to the structure and composition of elites. The results of those studies were pre-
sented at conferences in Prague, Warsaw and Cambridge in 1993–1996.  
Within the large range of studies carried out at that time one can identify two approaches to 
analyzing the evolution of elites in economies in transition. The first approach looks at elite 
transformation processes from the perspective of their ‘reproduction’ or ‘circulation’.14 By ‘re-
production’ they mean close relations and consistency between the old communist elite and the 
new ‘ruling class’. The ‘circulation’ model, on the contrary, suggests significant social trans-
formations and the emergence of new people with new basic values on the top of the social hi-
erarchy.15  
According to the results of a broad comparative study of national elites carried out in 1990–
1994 in six countries covering approximately 7,000 respondents,16 Russian elites showed a sig-
nificant level of succession – 51% representatives of 1993 elite groups already had top manage-
rial positions in the late 1980s. On the contrary, in Poland and Hungary the proportion was 
somewhat lower – 41% and 33% respectively. With a more thorough approach, the proportion 
of old top managers in Hungary and Poland turns out to be even lower – 25% and 15% – while 
Russia shows the same figures as indicated above. Finally, almost 80% of the new Russian elite 
were members of the Communist Party back in 1988. This figure was less than 30% in Hungary 
and slightly above 20% in Poland.17  
All this allowed for conclusions on the presence of the elite reproduction model in Russia and 
on trends towards elite circulation in Poland and Hungary. Besides, elite reproduction was re-
garded as detrimental to reform implementation in Russia and CIS. 
The second approach presented in Higley, Pakulski and Weselowsky, 1998 offers a more com-
plicated analytical model. These authors look at elite transformation in two dimensions – ana-
lysing the degree of unity and differentiation of the elite.  
By unity of the elite they mean common values shared by the majority of the elite in a specific 
country. Unity can be based on some ideological, religious or national doctrines or on adoption 
by representatives of the elite of the same agreed rules of the game under which it would be 
possible to resolve conflicts between different elite groups without violence. By differentiation 
they mean the degree of independence (autonomy) of the elite of the other larger social groups 
as well as heterogeneity of the elite, availability in its composition of elite sub-groups offering 
different values to the society and competing with one another in political decision-making. 
Different types of elites can appear in different countries depending on the combination of these 
two factors. The classification of these types is given in Table 1. 
According to John Higley and his colleagues, an ideocratic elite is characteristic for communist 
and fascist regimes. However, it is never completely monolithic and its unity is always under 
pressure exerted by various opposition, intellectual, religious and political groups. Nevertheless, 
the ‘ideocratic’ elite configuration prevailed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe until the 
1980s.  
                                                     
14 See, e.g., Szelenyi & Szelenyi, 1995. In this paper the models are contrasted as two different approaches. In our 
opinion, however, the authors interpret elite transformation as changes in elite structure in the same dimension. This 
is why we classify papers like this as one type of paper. 
15 Empiric studies show that pure elite circulation or reproduction almost never took place. Rather, these models can 
be regarded as certain conditional poles towards which real elite processes in some EE and ex-USSR countries are 
oriented. 
16 The surveys were carried out in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The results 
of the project for Hungary, Poland and Russia were partially presented in 1995 in a special issue of Theory and Soci-
ety. For more information see Szelenyi & Szelenyi, 1995; Hanley, Yershova & Anderson, 1995; Fodor, Wnuk-
Lipinsky & Yershova, 1995.  
17 See Fodor, Wnuk-Lipinsky & Yershova, 1995.  
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Table 1: Configurations of national elites and associated regime types (*) 
Elite unity  
Strong Weak 
Wide Consensus elite  
(stable democracy)  




Narrow Ideocratic elite  
(totalitarian regime) 
Divided elite  
(authoritarian regime) 
(*) This table is reproduced from Higley, Pakulski & Weselowsky, 1998, p. 5. 
Weakening ideological and political pressure from Moscow after M. Gorbachev took office 
unveiled opportunities for the nationalistic and liberal/democratic opposition, which became one 
of the reasons why the communist regimes collapsed in Eastern Europe and why the Soviet 
Union broke apart later on. It was then that a transition began from the ideocratic to other types 
of elite. 
The trajectory of this evolution was different depending on the previous history and the level of 
advancement of the communist regime itself. According to J. Higley and his coauthors, in Hun-
gary, Poland and Czech Republic there were preconditions for a ‘consensus’ elite based on the 
broader recognition of democratic values and the willingness to “return to Europe”.18 Movement 
towards a fragmented elite (with interelite groups breaking away without accepting new uniting 
values) was characteristic of Slovakia and Bulgaria. The ‘divided’ elite phenomenon – lack of 
uniting values with weak internal differentiation of the elite and its dependence on the other 
social groups – emerged in Romania and Ukraine. Finally, according to J. Higley and his col-
leagues, in Russia one could observe a complex combination of ‘divided’ and ‘fragmented’ 
elites with some weak conditions for creating a ‘consensus’ elite. 
On the whole, many researchers believe this multi-dimensional approach to be quite interest-
ing.19 It is however difficult to verify this approach with quantitative data. This is why most 
results of empiric studies were analyzed within the framework of the first approach interpreting 
transformation of the elites in terms of their ‘reproduction’ or ‘circulation’. 
Olga Kryshtanovskaya applied this approach in full to the situation in Russia.20 Her opinion is 
that power was exchanged for property in Russia, which allowed the old Soviet elite – which in 
this case was identical to the nomenklatura – to retain most of its positions (see Figure 3 on the 
following page). 
According to Kryshtanovskaya, a major role in elite reproduction during the transition to the 
market was played by the phenomenon of the ‘Komsomol economy’ of the late 1980ies com-
prising several hundreds of Young People’s Scientific and Technical Creativity Centers 
(NTTM’s), Youth Housing Cooperatives (MZhK’s), etc. It was through the ‘Komsomol econ-
omy’ that the assets of state-owned enterprises were redistributed in favour of those individuals 
who then managed to grow their capital significantly in export/import and financial transactions 
and became the backbone of the business elite due to their active participation in the privatiza-
tion process. 
                                                     
18 In Hungary and Poland, these values were shared by reform-oriented representatives of the former ruling party, 
which enabled them to get back to power during the 1993–1994 parliamentary elections. 
19 See, for example, Frane & Tomšič (2002), p.438–439. 
20 See Kryshtanovskaya (1996), Kryshtanovskaya & White (1996), Kryshtanovskaya (1999), Kryshtanovskaya 
(2002а), etc. 
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Figure 3: Origin of the Russian political and business elites (based on the results of ‘Transformation of 
Russian Business Elite’ survey carried out by the elite research division of the RAS (Russian Academy of 








Reproduced from Kryshtanovskaya (2002а), p. 38. 
Kryshtanovskaya resolves the problem of clear age differences between the contemporary Rus-
sian business elite and the Soviet nomenklatura by introducing the concept of ‘the authorized’ 
(‘upolnomochennye’): ‘…As the nomenklatura exchanged power for property it did not neces-
sarily get involved in risky commercial undertakings. Young ‘authorized’ people were selected 
for risky undertakings and to operate the state money … This was an attractive domain for peo-
ple of a different generation – active Komsomol functionaries, officials in the lowest positions 
of the middle range’.21 
The commercial and financial business elite nurtured by the nomenklatura did not immediately 
take control over major enterprises in the real sector of the economy. According to 
Kryshtanovskaya, it was only by 1996 that the business elite began to control about 50% of 
large business and it was at that time that the Russian oligarchy emerged. 
Kryshtanovskaya underlines the consistency between the old Soviet and the new Russian elites 
in her papers as well as the big overlap and close interaction between the business and political 
elites in the post-reform period. Kryshtanovskayas assumption that reproduction of the elite 
played a major role in Russia in the 1990ies is shared by many other researchers (see Ershova, 
1994; Shevtsova, 1995; Schröder, 1999, etc.). Some researchers, however, disagree with this 
point of view.  
For example, according to David Lane and Cameron Ross,22 the Russian political elite are 
rooted in the Soviet intelligentsia (intellectuals & professionals) rather than in the nomenkla-
tura. Lane and Ross make this assumption based on a detailed analysis of 470 biographies of 
representatives of Russia’s top political elite as of January 1995.23 The data they provide show 
                                                     
21 Kryshtanovskaya (2002а), p. 6. 
22 See Lane & Ross (1998). 
23 Lane and Ross identified three elite subgroups – parliamentary, governmental, and regional elite. The parliamen-
tary elite include top State Duma and Federation Council leaders as well as chairmen of committees of both chambers 
and their deputies. The governmental elite include federal ministers and their deputies. The regional elite include 
heads of Russian Federation constituencies, chairmen of legislative assemblies, and the president’s envoys in their 
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that the proportion of party bosses in important positions in the Soviet era was significant (52%) 
only in the regional elite. In 1995, many representatives of the Russian governmental elite 
(60%) had experience working at Soviet ministries and agencies but the positions they had had 
were normally not higher than heads of departments. As regards the parliamentary elite, those 
with experience in the Communist Party or government apparatus accounted for 19% and 22% 
respectively. These groups, however, show a partial overlap and approximately 2/3 of the par-
liamentary elite had no relation whatsoever to Soviet government structures. 
Based on their data Lane and Ross argue that a significant renovation of the Russian political 
elite took place as early as the beginning of the 1990’s and that it is not quite correct to speak 
about the ‘reproduction’ of this elite from the Soviet one. The authors explain the differences 
between their and other researchers’ results by the fact that the concepts of ‘elite’ and ‘nomenk-
latura’ were not identical in the Soviet Union. Lower nomenklatura positions did not provide 
significant leverage and did not mean that the person belonged to the elite. Moreover, in the 
1970–1980s the nomenklatura itself was no longer a uniform and united ‘political class’. The 
Soviet system at the later stages of its development can rather be regarded as a network of bu-
reaucratic elites where each elite had a relative autonomy and was pursuing its own interests.24  
Apart from nomenklatura and bureaucratic elites there was such a social group as intelligentsia. 
The intelligentsia could partially overlap with the nomenklatura (when people from science and 
culture were included in party committees of different levels and the appointments of directors 
of academic institutes were agreed in the Central Committee of the Communist Party). Never-
theless, the intelligentsia was normally better educated, more free-thinking and could, to a cer-
tain extent, compete with the nomenklatura elites – without turning into a counter-elite, though. 
In this connection Lane and Ross define the intelligentsia as an ascendant class, something simi-
lar to the  category of ‘professionals’ in Western democracies, and argue that it is representa-
tives of this very social group who came to power in the key areas of the Russian political sys-
tem as a result of the transformation of the early 1990ies.  
Lane and Ross thus challenge the assumption of the ‘reproduction’ of the Russian political elite. 
At the same time they point out its substantial heterogeneity and qualitative differences between 
the parliamentary and governmental elites, on the one hand, and the regional elite on the other. 
These differences are expressed not only in a bigger amount of former party functionaries on the 
regional level but also in the quality of education. For example, graduates of local agricultural, 
economic and polytechnic colleges as well as party schools prevail among the ‘regional’ people, 
while representatives of the parliamentary and governmental elites received at least one educa-
tion at Moscow or Leningrad universities.  
According to Lane and Ross, one can generalize that the federal elite is more cosmopolitan and 
has a stronger market orientation, as contrasted with parameters and values of regional elite 
more traditional for the Soviet period. At the same time, the federal elite turns out to be more 
heterogeneous and fragmented.  
                                                                                                                                                           
respective regions. The sample, however, does not include the highest-ranking officials from the Presidential Admini-
stration which plays an important role in the political process. Besides, the coverage of the regional and governmental 
elites was incomplete. In the first case Lane and Ross’ sample contains 195 people instead of at least 267 (3 represen-
tatives for each of 89 RF subjects). In the second case the sample is even less representative since big federal minis-
tries (Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of 
Defense, etc.) have 10 and more deputy ministers. On top of that, there has always been quite a big government appa-
ratus, where heads of departments match deputy federal ministers in terms of influence and authority. However, in 
Lane and Ross’ sample the entire governmental elite are represented by only 108 people. 
24 See Lane & Ross (1994), p.20. Similar opinions on the Soviet system are also expressed within the framework of 
the ‘administrative market’ concept – see Kordonsky (2000). 
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Post-crisis development trends  
The crisis of 1998 demonstrated the internal instability of the system having evolved under Bo-
ris Yeltsin featuring many decision-making centres and strong competition for resources and 
instruments of influence between various financial and political groups. In those conditions and 
given Boris Yeltsin’s ailing health as well as oncoming presidential elections one of the most 
urgent tasks for the Russian ruling elite was to ensure continuity. 
The task had been fulfilled by the beginning of 2000 when it took just four months for Vladimir 
Putin to be transformed from a new prime minister and then an acting president, a person who 
was hardly even known to experts, into a political figure enjoying the support of 40 per cent of 
the electorate. Concurrently, due to the success of the Unity Party and the Union of the Right 
Forces in the parliamentary elections a legislature controlled on the whole by the Presidential 
Administration and the government was formed for the first time in the whole period of reform.  
The appearance of the new president who had virtually no face of his own but received un-
precedented popular support as well as the success of the new ‘mainstream party’ without any 
program in parliament was viewed by political scientists as a vivid demonstration of the imma-
turity of the civil society and of broad opportunities to manipulate public opinion in contempo-
rary Russia.25  
At the same time the emergence of a popular president along with the end of the chronic con-
frontation with the parliament created prerequisites for change in relationships between various 
groups of the Russian elite. In that connection one can single out the following key trends char-
acteristic of the post-crisis period:  
А. Re-distribution of power between the federal centre and regions.  
Strong ‘centrifugal’ trends inherited from the period of the USSR’s disintegration made up one 
of the characteristic features of the 1990s. They can be described as relative economic and po-
litical autonomy of the regions. The objective prerequisites for this phenomenon were the failure 
on the part of the federal centre to collect taxes, comply with their own financial obligations and 
prevent autonomous fiscal activities by regional authorities.26 The fragmentation of the eco-
nomic space was facilitated by severe destruction of former economic ties and a drastic rise in 
transportation tariffs.  
As for political aspects the positions of the federal centre were significantly damaged by the 
outcome of the 1993 parliamentary elections.27 Subsequently, the power and influence of gover-
nors were getting stronger as the popularity of the president and the federal government was 
shrinking. As a result, it was only through the delegation of the broadest self-governance au-
thority that Boris Yeltsin was able to win support of regional and local administrations’ heads 
during the presidential elections of 1996.   
Following the 1998 crisis and Vladimir Putin’s ascension to power in particular a reverse 
movement was started. A. Zudin (2003) describes the trend in general terms as a transition from 
a “polycentric” model of the political regime to a “monocentric” one. The new president, who 
unlike his predecessor enjoyed the support of the electorate, declared a policy aimed at strength-
ening ‘the vertical line of power’. It resulted in noticeable limitations on the governors’ free-
doms that materialized in the form of a greater share of tax revenues for the federal centre, the 
introduction of federal districts headed by authorized representatives of the president and the 
                                                     
25 See Schroeder (2003) and other papers. 
26 David Woodruff saw this ‘feudalization’ of economic and political relations between the centre and the regions as 
one of the key reasons for the creation and dissemination of ‘monetary surrogates’ (see Woodruff, 1999). 
27 For a detailed overview of studies dedicated to Russian elections of the early to mid 1990ies see Gel’man (2000). 
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Federation Council reform.28 Under pressure from the Prosecutor’s Office the provisions of 
regional regulations conflicting with federal legislation began to be annulled. A review of terms 
and a gradual departure from “separate” bilateral agreements between the federal government 
and subjects of the Federation was initiated.  
Attempts made by governors to oppose the trend leading to centralization (particularly through 
the “Motherland – All Russia” bloc) were of little success. In general, summarizing the assess-
ments of developments made by experts it is possible to point out the federal centre’s stronger 
positions in its relationship with regional authorities.29 
B. Relative reduction of the direct impact of big business on politics 
From the mid-1990ies onwards, much attention has traditionally been paid in publications to the 
processes of the business-elite evolution and the study of its impact on political decision-
making.30 The reason is the role big business played in Boris Yeltsin’s re-election as president 
in 1996 and the actions by Russian oligarchs in the political arena that followed. However, in 
the post-crisis period the role of big business in politics and social life changed drastically.  
One of the objective reasons for the change was the weakening of most of the banking oligarch 
groups as a result of the devaluation and default of August 1998. Some of them totally disap-
peared from the scene (such as Inkombank and SBS-Agro) while others managed to restore 
their positions in business only with the help of their industrial assets and their transfer to affili-
ated companies, although it took them quite some time to do so.  
At the same time the economic growth triggered by the steep fall of the rouble and subsequent 
expansion of the taxation base in the budget brought about further preconditions for the authori-
ties to distance themselves from big business. During that time all attempts by Boris Berezovsky 
and Vladimir Gusinsky, seeking to return to the previous model of relationships, to exert pres-
sure on the authorities through the mass media under their control were suppressed rather 
roughly.  
Therefore, if in the mid-1990ies big business could to some extent dictate its terms to the au-
thorities, under President Putin, who declared the principle of equidistance for the oligarchs, it, 
according to Kryshtanovskaya, was faced with the following choice: to support the president or 
leave the scene.31 However, big business retained certain instruments to influence political deci-
sion-making – first and foremost, through the presence of their people in the state executive 
power structures and the legislature.32 The instruments, however, are being used not so much for 
the direct lobbying of interests of individual companies as for influencing the shaping of the 
general rules of the game. For the same ends, the promotion of the collective interests of big 
business, major associations of entrepreneurs were set up with much support of the government 
in 2000–2001, namely the ‘renewed’ Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) 
headed by the leading oligarchs, Business Russia (Delovaya Rossiya), the Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry (TPP) headed by E. Primakov, and some others.  
                                                     
28 Before 2000, the Federation Council included the governors and the heads of regional legislative assemblies (which 
gave the regional policy-makers the ability to influence political decisions on the federal level). Under the new ar-
rangement, a representative of the governor and a representative of the head of the legislative assembly are sent to the 
Federation Council instead of level one leaders. 
29 The question, in our view, is to what extent the federal centre can really control the governors claiming to be loyal 
to the current president. 
30 See Kryshtanovskaya (1996), Schroeder (1999), Pappe (2000), Pleines (2003a), etc. 
31 See Kryshtanovskaya (2002а), p.58.  
32 Some examples: there are a number of regions where the government is directly controlled by big business 
(R. Abramovich in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, A. Khloponin in Krasnoyarsk Krai, etc.), the Presidential Admini-
stration employs a whole range of Alfa Group people, and the State Duma with the new Federation Council where we 
can see many business people. 
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C. Shifts inside the federal elite 
The changes in the relationships between the federal centre and regions as well as between big 
business and the state led to certain shifts in the Russian elite’s structure. As was shown by 
Hans-Henning Schroeder in his publication based on the study of most influential politicians’ 
ratings published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta on a regular basis,33 in the post-crisis period the posi-
tions of the Presidential Administration and the government inproved in the ratings; those of 
representatives of the regions, parliament and political parties decreased, while big business, 
following some fluctuations, generally retained and from 2001 even strengthened its positions. 
According to Zudin, the policy pursued by President Putin resulted in a noticeable reduction of 
influence by regional leaders, ‘oligarchs’ and the Moscow elite at the federal level. Similarly, 
the role of mass media and judges, who in the mid-1990ies had acted as go-betweens in con-
flicts between other elite groups, diminished. The beneficiaries, according to Zudin, were only 
those who represented the so-called ‘power ministries’ and ‘St. Petersburg people’ who were in 
secondary positions in the 1990ies.34 
It is also stressed by Kryshtanovskaya that the security services and the military strengthened 
their role while the people who President Putin had been associated with when he worked in St. 
Petersburg were mostly nominated within the framework of new appointments. According to 
her (see Table 2), every fourth representative of the Putin elite had a military background. Here, 
the large share of people representing the military, the FSB (Federal Security Service), the 
MVD (Ministry of Interior) and other ‘power agencies’ is typical for the offices of the author-
ized presidential representatives in the federal districts. For example, ‘people in uniform’ made 
up 35 per cent of all chief federal inspectors in 2000–2002.35 Among other structural shifts one 
can point out a much lower share of holders of a second degree (kandidat or doktor, approxi-
mately equivalent to PhD and professor, respectively) as well as graduates of the elite Moscow 
universities and a rise in numbers of ‘big business appointees’. 
According to Kryshtanovskaya, the fact that President Putin is placing his hopes on ‘siloviki’ 
(representatives of the ‘power ministries’, the state security organs and the armed forces) is 
explained by the fact that during Boris Yeltsin’s rule the state institutes were greatly weakened, 
the political system lost its stability, and traditional links between the social subjects were dam-
aged, making their roles uncertain. The hierarchies of bureaucracy and military suffered the 
least during this period. However, the bureaucracy was infamous for its high level of corruption, 
making it easier for President Putin to start strengthening the state by restoring the network of 
the ‘power ministries and agencies’ that would later serve as the pillar for his personal power 
and authority and the foundation for the enhancement of the state functions of control and re-
pressions.36 These changes are generally described by Kryshtanovskaya as the emergence of ‘a 
liberal militocracy’, showing a trend of restoring the hierarchical structures and institutions 
characteristic of the Soviet period. 
Based on the analysis of interaction between big business and the state, a number of authors37 
also stress the trend toward the development of state-corporate capitalism. Within this frame-
work the ‘power privatization’ model typical of the 1990ies is being substituted by a regime of 
regular, both formal and informal, coordination of interests between the state structures and the 
biggest corporations that form various unions and associations. Here, some researchers who 
predicted the trend several years previously are viewing it as positive and, at any rate, more 
                                                     
33 See Schroeder (2003), pp. 189–190. 
34 See Zudin (2003), pp.71–73. 
35 See Kryshtanovskaya (2002b), p.163. 
36 See Kryshtanovskaya (2002b), p.174. 
37 See Zudin (2001), Peregudov (2003), and others. 
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adequate for the Russian ‘institutional landscape’ as opposed to the liberal experiments of the 
1990s.38 
Table 2: Changes in the characteristics of the elite in the first two years of Yeltsin’s and Putin’s terms in 
office, in percent. 




Average age (years) 51.3 51.5 
Women 2.9 1.7 
Persons with origins in rural areas 23.1 31.0 
University graduates (one degree) 99.0 100.0 
University graduates with more than one degree (e.g., PhD) 52.5 20.9 
Persons with a military education 6.7 26.6 
Persons with an education in economics and law 24.5 25.7 
Elite universities’ graduates** 35.4 23.4 
Natives of St. Petersburg  13.2 21.3 
Big business appointees 1.6 11.3 
Military 11.2 25.1 
Source: The table is reproduced from Kryshtanovskaya (2002b), p. 161 and is based on data collected by 
a study of the Russian elite conducted by the elite research division of the RAS (Russian Academy of 
Sciences) Institute of Sociology starting from 1989.  
(*) The term “elite” applies to Security Council members, deputies of both houses of the Federal Assem-
bly, members of the government and heads of the Federation subjects.  
(**) The notion of elite universities applies to MGU (Moscow State University) the MGIMO (Moscow 
State Institute for Foreign Relations), the Institute of Foreign Languages, the VPSh (Party Higher 
School), the VKSh (Komsomol Higher School), the ANKh (National Economy Academy under the 
USSR Council of Ministers), the AON (Academy for Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee), 
the MFI (Moscow Institute of Finance), the Academy for Foreign Trade and the Diplomatic Academy. 
At the same time, according to other experts,39 despite the significant strengthening of the state 
actors’ positions (primarily on the federal level) the evolving structure is characterized by being 
unstable to a certain degree. Under the circumstances, support of the ‘power ministries’ requires 
bigger budgets for the Ministry of Defence, FSB, and the Ministry of Interior. The interests of 
big business are still far from being homogeneous40 while some of its representatives from time 
to time begin to demonstrate political ambitions of their own (during recent months, references 
were made most frequently to M. Khodorkovsky in this respect).  
Under the circumstances the key resource for President Putin to keep the situation under control 
remains broad electoral support. The idea was very clearly formulated by Zudin: “Putin’s un-
usually high rating at the beginning of the second Chechen war in the autumn of 1999 has be-
come the initial component of the new political regime. From that time on a stable bond be-
tween the Kremlin and the people has existed… If the [Yeltsin] polycentric system was based 
                                                     
38 See, e.g., Lane (2000). 
39 See Schroeder (2003). 
40 The discussions on Russia’s accession to the WTO, banking reform, currency regulation, etc. are very indicative in 
this respect. 
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on the union of the Kremlin and the elites then the foundation of the [Putin] monocentric system 
is founded on an informal ‘social contract’ circumventing the elites”.41 
However, with due regard to the social problems yet to be resolved and gradually growing scep-
tical attitudes of the people to the concrete steps and reforms initiated by President Putin broad 
popular support can only be secured through a steady growth of living standards. And, there-
fore, as pointed out by Schroeder, the key prerequisite for a success of President Putin’s policy 
is a continuous improvement of the country’s economic situation.42 That was the reason why the 
president and his administration showed such a painful reaction to the slowdown in the pace of 
growth in late 2001 as well as to the cautious mid-term forecast by the government published in 
the spring of 2002. This was also the reason for Putin’s aim, declared in May 2003, to double 
the GDP over the next decade. However, as was pointed out in the Introduction to the present 
paper, it is still unclear how and on the basis of which mechanisms this objective can be 
achieved and what influential social groups can contribute to it in real life.    
Social basis of reforms in Russia: interaction  
and evolution of interests  
In the previous section we tried to show the basic approaches towards the analysis of the social 
basis of reforms given in the research done so far. In our opinion, it is possible, on the basis of 
the conclusions of this review, to outline a range of questions that have not yet been answered. 
As far as the reviewed models of social collaboration in an economy in transition are concerned, 
the grounds for transition of a specific country (or a group of countries) to a certain trend of 
reforms, as well as the ways out of the traps of ‘partial reforms’ and ‘political polarization’ are 
not completely clear. In this respect the initial differences in the social and institutional structure 
of different countries are of great importance, and in the first part of this section we will focus 
on this issue. At this point we do not aim at confirming the correctness of the path dependence 
idea. Such an analysis seems crucial to us because the above-mentioned differences influence 
the behaviour of participants of social interactions and must be taken into account when review-
ing the evolution of interests of the main groups of players on the economic and political scene. 
As for analysis of elite evolution, we will try to give our explanation of the structural changes 
which took place at the beginning of the 1990ies and which are interpreted differently by ex-
perts. However, the question of succession or renewal of the elites is in our opinion not so im-
portant today. Of greater importance are the tools of collaboration between business and gov-
ernment (and political and business elites, accordingly) because, bearing in mind the weakness 
of political democracy and civil institutions in Russia, it is the government and big business that 
are the key players which define the development prospects of the economy and society. 
In this context, the problem of the previous studies is, in our view, a certain absolutization of the 
dominant trends or strategies of behaviour as well as a lack of delimitation of interests inside 
influential social groups.43 In this respect, we proceed from the idea that at any moment of time 
along with the dominant strategy other strategies are also possible, which can form the basis for 
alternative ways of development. Such strategies are always connected with certain interests. 
Besides, in business, as a rule, there is a direct correlation between strategies and interests, 
which lay in their ground. As for the state, on the contrary, such a correlation is not definitely 
                                                     
41 See Zudin (2003), p.70. 
42 Schroeder (2003), p.175. 
43 For example, we think that Pleines in a quite interesting paper (2003b) incorrectly equals the interests of the state to 
the interests of consolidated ‘state actors’, while possible substantial differences in the interests of the ‘state actors’ 
themselves are ignored.  
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expressed because there can be considerable discrepancies between the individual interests of 
specific public officials or politicians, their group (corporate) interests and interests of the state 
or society in general. 
Taking into account such discrepancies in the interests of both business and the state, we can 
answer the most important question: which social groups are able to support reforms or a policy 
of economic growth in the conditions of an established ‘bad equilibrium’ in the form of ‘privati-
zation of the state’ and ‘political polarization’. Below we will concentrate specifically on this 
question. 
Initial differences in social and institutional structures of transition 
countries 
In our opinion, the initial differences in the social structure of society have to a great extent 
shaped the different results of social and economic developments currently evident in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and China, on the one hand, and Russia along with CIS 
countries, on the other hand. In this respect it is also interesting to trace the comparisons with 
post-war Germany, which, like Russia at the beginning of the 1990ies, underwent a radical 
change of the regime and faced a serious ideological crisis. However, despite all this, Western 
Germany as early as the late 1950ies showed powerful economic growth, which so far is not the 
case in Russia. 
In general, we think that unlike Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, Russia and 
other republics of the former USSR at the end of the 1980’s did not have a social basis for a 
policy aimed at forming a competitive market economy and a competitive (i.e. democratic) po-
litical system. 
This notion at first sight does is at odds with the wide social support for the democratic and 
market reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in the late 1980ies – early 1990ies. 
However, in this regard it is necessary to distinguish between political declarations and objec-
tive interests of the influential social groups which stood behind the reformers. In this respect 
there were two crucial differences between Russia and Central/Eastern Europe. 
First, in Russia there was no historical experience of living in a market economy and a democ-
ratic system. Therefore, the absolute majority of the population did not realize that market and 
democracy stood not only for freedom, but also for responsibility. 
Second, the social and political structure in Russia was qualitatively different. In Eastern 
Europe, a substantial part of the social elite, the intelligentsia, was not incorporated into the 
government structures. Such people worked in enterprises and research institutes, gave lectures 
at universities, but they were not members of the Communist Party and were not present in the 
party and economic apparatus. In fact, such people were holders of an alternative ideology, 
which latently existed in the society and expressed itself during the 1956 events in Hungary, 
during the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968, in the actions of the independent Solidarity trade union in 
Poland, etc. Due to this fact, by the time the Communist regime broke down at the end of the 
1980ies it was possible to replace the people in the government structures, i.e. new people with 
other values could come to power. 
Besides, the idea of European integration was without any doubt of great importance for the 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. The notions of ‘market’ and ‘de-
mocracy’ were regarded as symbols of Europe, which these nations wanted to belong to. That is 
why such common European values acted as a kind of external anchor ensuring the coordination 
of numerous and different conflicting individual interests. 
This is a very important circumstance, because without common values society loses its guide-
lines and cannot shape the prospects of its own development. An obvious illustration of the 
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above remarks is, in our opinion, the difficult experience of the decade of reforms in Russia, 
when a deep crisis of the old ideology was not accompanied by the adoption of new values and 
ideals by society.  
We see the main reason for this in the fact that in the USSR there was no real internal opposi-
tion and the number of alternative ideology bearers was rather limited. The policy of restriction 
of any alternative thinking in the USSR, which was consistently implemented for 70 years, re-
sulted in either physical extermination of potential opposition in the period of repressions, or 
expulsion from the country, or integration into government structures. A transition from the 
Stalinist totalitarian regime to the authoritarian model of the 1950ies–1980ies was manifested, 
in particular, in a reduction of the scale of direct repressions. Nevertheless, the mainstream party 
and economic elite turned a blind eye to expressions of alternative ideas among scientific and 
art intelligentsia as long as they did not appear to be in opposition to the regime and was not 
shown publicly. As a result, only very small groups of dissidents voicing radical criticism of the 
system, who, as a rule, were not able to propose any constructive reform program, continued to 
be free from association with the regime. 
We believe that specifically at this point it is worth returning to the discussion of the role, which 
the intelligentsia plays in the continuity and renewal of the elites described in the section 
“Transformation of the elites”. In our opinion, as far as political and economic reforms in the 
late 1980ies–early 1990ies are concerned, we can talk about interaction of four conventional 
groups of interests in the Russian elite. These are the older and younger generation within the 
‘nomenklatura’, as well as the older, more idealistic, and the younger, more pragmatic and cyni-
cal, generations of the intelligentsia. The nomenklatura’s social status as a real ‘ruling class’ 
was undoubtedly higher, however, the upper tiers of the Soviet intelligentsia in one way or an-
other always collaborated with the ‘nomenklatura’ and in this sense were close to the state. 
In the first years of perestroika the struggle for power was going on inside the ‘nomenklatura’ 
and its younger generation actively used the democratic and market slogans in order to push out 
the older comrades. The intelligentsia at that time in general supported the younger generation 
of the ‘nomenklatura’, feeding it with new ideas. But, while the older generation of the intelli-
gentsia in this case was rather oriented towards reforming the existing system and construction 
of ‘socialism with a human face’, the younger generation which was represented mostly by 
young Komsomol leaders44 was mostly striving to achieve personal benefits from the situation 
and from personal proximity to power. 
It was on this foundation, in our view, that the so-called ‘komsomol economy’ emphasized so 
much by Kryshtanovskaya came into being. However, supporting such entrepreneurial initia-
tives, the top party officials never thought that in such a manner they gave away their power or 
created ‘backup airfields’ for themselves. They believed that the leverage would remain in their 
hands as it was during the NEP (New Economic Policy) period in the 1920ies. They needed the 
‘komsomol’ economy as a way of paying off the younger colleagues because in the Soviet sys-
tem there was no normal mechanism for change of generations in the ‘nomenklatura’. Members 
of the top level of the nomenklatura elite, being busy with their corporate infighting or just lack-
ing sufficient knowledge, did not understand the real consequences of the actions and steps 
which the komsomol entrepreneurs convinced them to authorize. 
                                                     
44 Here it is necessary to emphasize that by the 1980ies komsomol was a mass organization and all socially active 
young people passed through it if they were not in direct opposition to the regime. This fully applies to the young art, 
scientific and technical intelligentsia, for whom successful komsomol activity was not necessarily connected with a 
future successful career in the party nomenklatura or governmental bodies. Such a tendency could be related to a 
general expansion of komsomol establishment influence within the Soviet administrative hierarchy, because many 
initiatives of young members of the scientific and art intelligentsia before had been authorized by the party bodies 
without bypassing the komsomol committees. For example, according to Yakov Pappe, the School of Economics and 
Mathematics at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State University in the 1970ies was supervised directly by 
one of the members of the faculty party committee. 
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By 1989–1990 the administration of the country had passed mainly into the hands of the 
younger generation of the ‘nomenklatura’. At the same time idealistic representatives of the 
older generation of the intelligentsia entered government bodies. Since then in our opinion a 
certain competition for control over the Soviet legacy began between the younger generation of 
the ‘nomenklatura’ and the younger members of the intelligentsia who were close to govern-
ment structures. 
This period is marked by the selective take-over of big enterprises in the form of joint-stock 
companies, authorization of the so-called lease with subsequent buyout for medium-sized and 
small enterprises, as well as transformation of ministries and institutions into concerns and as-
sociations, which in fact reflected the attempts by the ‘nomenklatura’ to keep the real power in 
their hands by obtaining control over property. However, only in very few cases such joint-
stock companies, concerns and associations turned into really functioning big business struc-
tures, just because the majority of the Soviet ‘nomenklatura’ (including its younger generation) 
were not trained managers or skilled businessmen.45 Very typical in this respect is the destiny of 
the majority of ‘red directors’ who at the first stage of privatization usually managed to retain 
control over their enterprises but lost it afterwards because of their inability to manage enter-
prises under the new market conditions.46 
Therefore, the younger generation of the ‘nomenklatura’ was rather oriented towards a gradual, 
‘creeping’ transformation of the old system. On the contrary, the more educated and energetic 
younger generation of the intelligentsia placed their bets on a radical destruction of the existing 
regime in order to achieve their objectives. For that purpose this elite group, relying on their 
proximity to the Russian authorities, managed to use new opportunities for the benefit of their 
business, and afterwards for the strengthening of their political positions. And while the August 
1991 coup may be regarded as the last attempt of resistance on the part of the older generation 
of the ‘nomenklatura’, the shelling of the Russian ‘White House’ and dissolution of the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet in autumn 1993 meant removal of the Soviet ‘nomenklatura’ as an influential 
social group from real political power at the federal level. Such a thing did not happen, how-
ever, in the majority of the regions because the top intellectuals were traditionally concentrated 
in Moscow and other big cities. In the regions, in many cases power still remained in the hands 
of the old party and economic elite. 
However, it is important that both in the centre and in the regions the new people who came to 
power in the early 1990ies under the slogans of democratic and market reform were in fact 
guided by their own, private interests. The drastic weakening of the state in that period did not 
happen by mere chance. It enabled the new governing elite to remove the old centralized control 
mechanisms, which had restricted the freedom of action of the old Soviet ‘nomenklatura’ to a 
certain extent, and at the same time to strengthen its positions institutionally (within the privati-
zation process). With all the differences in opinions on the reform policy, in this respect the 
positions of the younger generation of the Soviet intelligentsia and the younger generation of 
the Soviet ‘nomenklatura’ coincided completely: both groups wished to obtain control as 
quickly as possible over the property earlier managed by the old Soviet bureaucratic establish-
ment. And the state was not to be an obstacle for them.47 
                                                     
45 A certain exception in this regard may be the enterprises which underwent the procedure of lease with subsequent 
buyout. In many cases they proved to be more stable and viable. It is possible that their relative success is due to the 
fact that this option in late 1980ies was chosen by very well equipped enterprises led by energetic and market-
oriented directors. 
46 This fact, by the way, did not change the Russian corporate management model. It has been and it is of insider 
nature, but in the majority of cases control passed over into the hands of new private owners who can interact with 
old managers as with minor partners. 
47 These assumptions were confirmed in the framework of the discussions regarding demand for law. Katarina Pistor 
notes that at the time of property redistribution there will be no demand for a law, because it imposes undesirable 
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Therefore, unlike in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states48 the intelligentsia in Rus-
sia were not a counter-elite which could replace the party and economic nomenklatura and bring 
in new values and ideals.49 In contrast to China, Russia at the period of radical political and 
economic changes already had no capable old elite. 
By the time economic reforms began in China in the late 1970ies Communist rule had existed 
for less than 30 years. There was no such crisis of ideology and internal corrosion of the state 
and demoralization of the elite which were observed in the USSR in late 1970ies – early 
1980ies, and which, to our mind, were some of the reasons for the precipitous collapse of the 
Soviet system. In addition, despite growing corruption and increasing social differentiation of 
the society, the Chinese party and governmental elite remained quite consolidated and consid-
erably oriented towards promoting their national interests.50 This may also be the result of a 
different cultural inheritance, and distinctive cultural self-sufficiency of China. Unlike Russia, 
which for several centuries strived to catch up with developed countries, China always regarded 
Europe and the USA as ‘another world’ with their own values and ideals which could not be 
rooted in the Chinese soil. Above all, the feeling of its cultural superiority enabled China to 
easily and comfortably adopt from other nations any technical achievements along with organ-
izational and administrative know-how.51 
We think that in general parallels with China could have been possible if the market transforma-
tions had begun in the USSR during Khrushchev’s rule, when the state was much stronger and 
the top levels of elite were able to be guided not only by their private interests, but also by the 
interests of the society. But even at that time the probability of following the current trend of 
‘Chinese reforms’ was, in our opinion, very low. 
A. Fedorovski notes that by the end of the 1970ies internal political troubles and disorganization 
of economic life in China caused by the ”cultural revolution”, had led to a situation where ad-
ministrative and state institutions were equally unable to perform efficiently traditional com-
mand and distribution functions or to oppose reforms. In addition, some of the Communist Party 
of China leaders headed by Deng Xiaoping were still represented by revolutionaries of the first 
wave, who had long political experience and were flexible in their reaction to the events, reject-
ing, if necessary, ideological dogmas.52 The USSR, on the contrary, emerged from the Second 
World War with a stronger bureaucracy, which had been transformed into a self-contained 
force. Above all, the repressions of the late 1930ies followed by the ‘negative selection’ of party 
functionaries resulted in domination of poorly educated dogmatists in the Soviet administration 
in the 1950ies. 
The last comparison is worth relating to post-war Germany. Similar to Russia today, it experi-
enced a profound transformation of the regime and a radical reform of political institutions. The 
country was in a deep economic crisis. At the same time, the first post-war years were marked 
                                                                                                                                                           
restrictions on the participants of the ‘big fight’ (see Pistor, 1999). And if such players can prevent formation of a 
regulatory framework, they will do so. 
48 The Baltic republics are in general a special case. They are close to Central and Eastern Europe in terms of their 
democratic experience, a shorter term of living in the socialistic system, a high level of national self-consciousness, 
and perception of the Soviet regime as occupational. However, we can hardly talk about the existence of a manifest 
counter-elite in the Baltic republics. It is more probable, as Pappe thinks, that the old elite was ideally placed to sad-
dle the national horse. 
49 Many researchers (see, for instance, Frane & Tomšič (2002)) consider the existence of an active counter-elite 
relying on different social values as the key condition of successful reforms in a number of East European countries. 
50 One indirect confirmation of this notion is the ‘planned’ change of top leaders in China in November 2002 at the 
XVI. Congress of the Communist Party of China, with a preservation of the previous political course. For more de-
tails about Chinese social and economic development trends see Gel’bras, Kuznetsova (2003). 
51 Such peculiarities of China were demonstrated by Pappe during the discussion of the first brief version of this 
article.  
52 See Fedorovski (2003), p. 77. 
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by a deep ideological crisis.53 Although the old elite had discredited itself, the government was 
for a long time dominated by officials who had worked during the Nazi rule. Nevertheless, by 
the end of the 1950ies Germany had overcome the crisis, and the 1960ies became the decade of 
the German ‘economic miracle’. What was the basis for this, and what is the difference between 
Russia of the 1990ies and post-war Germany? 
We believe that these questions as well as a more general subject of understanding the history of 
post-war Germany are worth a much more detailed discussion which has only begun in the Rus-
sian-language literature.54 Notwithstanding, without going into a detailed discussion, we would 
like, along with traditional discourse about the role of the occupational administration in resto-
ration of democratic institutions and the importance of US economic aid, to define a range of 
other parameters in which the situation in post-war Germany considerably differed from the 
reform period in Russia:55 
• Time factor and nature of the regime. The Nazi regime in Germany existed for 12 years 
only and it was preceded by a period of democratic development. Correspondingly, the ma-
jority of the population had experience of living in a democracy, and many of them had 
voted against Hitler in 1933. Besides, in Germany there was a transition from totalitarian to 
democratic regime. And the ‘negative side’ of the totalitarian regime in that case was much 
more evident. In the USSR, on the contrary, a totalitarian system was replaced in the 1950–
60ies by an authoritarian regime which gave much less sufferings to people. That is why in 
Russia of the 1990ies the contrast was not so pronounced and the advantages of the democ-
ratic system were not so evident for many ordinary people, especially against the back-
grounds of falling living standards. 
• Political transformations and economic crisis. The Nazi regime was unable to achieve a 
serious transformation of the economic relations. Besides, as a result of the war the national 
economy of Germany went bankrupt and political reforms started in the conditions of a 
dramatic economic slump which had already reached its lowest point. Economic growth 
which took place later and was somewhat inevitable stimulated confidence in the revived 
democratic institutes. As for Eastern Europe and especially the Soviet Union, where eco-
nomic disproportions were much deeper, introduction of democratic institutions began si-
multaneously with the economic crisis, which was certainly far from inspiring confidence in 
the new institutes. 
• Institutional environment. In Germany there was no need for radical transformation of all 
the institutions. Democratic institutions were destroyed, but they were conserved in the 
memory of the majority of the population. The rest of the institutions (primarily legal ones) 
continued to function. In the Nazi period they worked on the basis of the Nazi laws, and 
they had to be filled with different content, but it was not necessary to revive and build the 
institutions anew. The same is true in regard to market institutions. Under the Nazis the state 
influenced them to a large extent, but they still existed and had not been destroyed. 
The latter difference is also important in the context of discussions about the reasons for “politi-
cal polarization” and a concrete country being trapped in ‘partial reforms’. Along with a lack of 
legal and market institutions, the Russian economy in comparison with other socialist econo-
mies was characterized by a greater degree of structural distortion.56 The share of the military-
                                                     
53 The crisis was preconditioned by the fact that at the end of the 1930ies the majority of the German population 
supported Hitler. As was mentioned by Professor Udo Wengst at a seminar in the Institute of Modern History in 
Munich on March 19, 2003, according to sociological survey data up to 2/3 of the older respondents regarded 1936–
1939 as the most comfortable years of their life until the mid 1950ies. 
54 See Schtolting (2000), Margolina (2002), Nolte, Polyan (2003).  
55 The author expresses his gratitude to Professors Horst Möller and Udo Wengst for a number of interesting judg-
ments expressed in the course of the seminar in the Institute of Modern History in Munich on March 19, 2003. 
56 The mechanisms of reproduction and accumulation of structural distortions in the Soviet economy at the beginning 
of the 1980ies were analyzed in detail by Yaremenko (1997), volume 1, chapters I–III. The logic of such distortions 
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industrial complex and the gap between the domestic and world prices for raw materials, in-
vestment and consumer products can serve as indicators. The latter parameter depended consid-
erably on how closed the economy was and on how long the command system had existed in the 
country, since price distortions were accumulated, reproduced and grew as time passed. 
Such large-scale structural deformations along with a profound institutional vacuum created 
more possibilities in Russia than in other countries for arbitration between the market and non-
market (regulated) sectors of the economy, and generated a bigger potential rent. That is why 
the stakes in the game of ‘social heritage’ distribution were many times higher, likewise the 
motivation to break the rules and norms.57 In our opinion, this was the reason for a shift towards 
‘partial reforms’, which made it possible to obtain a rent and became a prerequisite for ‘political 
polarization’, because in a situation where rules were missing or were broken on a large scale, 
the results of distribution of property and resources were perceived as unjust.58 
Returning to the analysis of developments in post-war Germany we can say that direct analogies 
with modern Russia can hardly be drawn. Nevertheless, it is possible to learn certain lessons 
from the German experience. As Schroeder noted, a major role in the social and political devel-
opment of the FRG was played by the perception of the USA as a good example along with the 
existence of the USSR and GDR as the ‘enemies’. There is no such ideological ‘anchor’ in to-
day’s Russia, which may hinder the reform process. Studies of the transformation of elites in 
post-war Germany are also of interest. As shown in the works of many German authors,59 dur-
ing the first post-war years removal of people who had collaborated with the Nazi regime from 
the political elite and return of the ideological opponents of Nazism to politics were combined 
with a high degree of succession in the bureaucratic and business elite. A real renewal of such 
elite groups together with a considerable change of the mindset of the society and a new look at 
German history took place only in the 1960ies. 
In this context it is rather interesting to look at the comparative analysis of changes in the Ger-
man elite in the periods after 1945 and after 1989 done by Ursula Hoffmann-Lange.60 Her data 
allows for assumptions that non-acceptance of changes by the citizens of the former GDR, de-
spite multibillion investments and social aid programs, was, among other things, caused by East 
German elite groups who had suddenly lost their positions. For instance, people from West 
Germany dominated the majority of social and economic spheres even in East German states 
(Land), to say nothing of the federal level. 
To sum up the comparison between different countries, we can identify two factors which, in 
our opinion, were of crucial importance for the success of economic and political transforma-
tions: 
1. Retention of functioning institutes. In this respect, the conclusions made in the book by a 
well-known Polish economist, deputy prime minister and minister of finance of Poland in 1994–
1997 Grzegorz Kolodko appear to be very accurate.61 His detailed analysis of development in 
                                                                                                                                                           
was also shown by Kornai (1990). The influence of structural deformations inherited from the Soviet period upon 
economic reform in Russia is discussed in Yakovlev (2001).   
57 That is why, for example, expansion and acuteness of corporate conflicts are determined not only by 
the severity of the law enforcement system, but also by the scale of potential benefits related to violation 
of shareholders’ rights. This assumption is substantiated in great detail in the article by Woodruff (2003) 
on the basis of a comparative analysis of data for Russia and Poland. 
58 It is characteristic that until now, according to data of different sociological surveys, about 2/3 of re-
spondents usually support proposals to review the privatization results. 
59 Issues of social and political transformation and reintegration of the Nazi elite in postwar Germany are discussed in 
great detail in the works by Norbert Frei and his colleagues (see Frei (1999), Frei (2002)). 
60 Hoffmann-Lange (1998). 
61 Kolodko (2000). 
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the former socialist countries in 1980–1990 shows that the depth of the ‘transitional’ crisis and 
further economic development was conditioned by the retention of capable institutions in some 
countries and catastrophic incapability of the government in others. It is evident that such func-
tioning institutions should have been mostly inherited from the preceding regime. In our opin-
ion, it is not so important what the nature and contents of such institutions were (see the exam-
ple of China). The substantial thing is to what extent they supported the transformation proc-
esses ensuring the ongoing activity of economic agents and performance of routine functions by 
the state. 
In Russia, unfortunately, the old institutions were already destroyed in 1991–1992, while the 
system of new institutions only started to take shape and function by the end of the 1990ies. As 
we tried to show above, the elite groups in general were interested in such an institutional vac-
uum, because without any rules it was easier for them to divide the former state property. 
2. Existence of a strong elite able to offer common values to society and to adhere to those val-
ues. As mentioned above, in the opinion of some authors, success of economic and political 
transformations in Eastern Europe was connected to the existence of counter-elites. The Chinese 
experience shows that reforms are possible even if the old elite is dominant. A more important 
thing is, in our view, that the elite should have the values, which unite it with the rest of society. 
Erosion of values inside the ruling Soviet elite in the period of stagnation without existence of 
any considerable counter-elites resulted in a situation where the beginning of the 1990ies there 
were no influential social groups in Russia able to take into account and promote the interests of 
the society along with their own private interests.62 
Therefore, we believe that the course Russia took in the 1990ies was to a great extent inevitable: 
in 1990–1991 Russia did not have enough prerequisites to opt for any other way of reforms. 
Now the situation is different. First, big private business practically non-existent in the 1980ies 
started to play an active role in economic and political life.63 Second, after Putin came to power, 
considerable strengthening of institutes set up in the middle of the 1990ies has been observed. 
Thus, it is necessary to understand the role being played by the new elite groups. How are their 
interests changing? And to what degree will the new institutional environment promote or hin-
der the future transformation processes? We will try to answer these questions in the following 
subsections. 
Evolution of business strategies and impact of the 1998 crisis 
A sceptical attitude towards the Soviet nomenklatura was typical of the perestroika period.64 
However, most expectations related to market players were optimistic at that time. It was sup-
posed that unlike the nomenklatura, the emerging ‘new business’ would actively support the 
reforms and promote the new market ideology. In this respect it is worth mentioning that in the 
1990ies many studies by the World Bank paid a lot of attention to the differences in the behav-
iour of state, privatized, and newly created private companies.  
                                                     
62 It is worth noting that recently not only social scientists who have long studied this problem have paid attention to 
the influence the value system has on economic development (see papers by N.I. Lapin, O.I. Shkaratan etc.), but also 
economists involved in economic policy development (see Yasin (2003)). 
63 Representatives of the director corps also formed a very influential group in the Soviet period (see Zaslavskaya, 
1988; Lane & Ross, 1994 etc.). However, heads of economic entities were officially subordinated to the top party 
nomenklatura. 
64 See Zaslavskaya (1988), Migranyan (1988) and other papers published in the well-known collection of articles “No 
other way” edited by Yu.N. Afanasiev. 
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These expectations never came true. In the papers by Joel Hellmann and colleagues65 already 
mentioned earlier it was convincingly shown that it is the ‘winning’ social groups represented, 
in particular, by new banking and trade business that become objectively interested in ‘partial 
reforms’. Incompleteness of reforms enabled them to retain their rent sources, despite the dam-
age caused to the economy and society. Above all, search for rent is the prevailing business 
strategy both for privatized and newly created private companies. 
Besides, our own experience as well as research by V. Radaev66 confirms the existence of two 
alternative business development strategies in the 1990ies. The first was aimed at keeping the 
maximum possible distance from the state, when business solved its problems itself and had to 
survive in a competitive environment. The second strategy assumed close integration with the 
state represented by concrete persons in governmental bodies or legislative structures which 
supported business in its competitive struggle much better than any criminal ‘protectors’. 
In the short term the second strategy was more successful because in comparison with the vol-
umes of budget flows channelled into the required direction by certain officials and politicians 
their personal compensation was very modest. As a result, investments into ‘contractual rela-
tions’ with the government proved much more efficient than investments into real business. 
Above all, it is worth mentioning that the prevalence of the second, opportunistic strategy in the 
business environment was objectively the result of the weak state and a degradation of its insti-
tutions. 
It is evident that such a ‘market’ economy could not be competitive. The reasons were direct or 
indirect restrictions imposed by the state on new businesses, very high costs of keeping up ‘con-
tractual relations’ between business and government, and retention of less efficient enterprises 
that base their market strategy on such ‘contractual relations’. However, with all the damage to 
the society and large-scale misappropriation of the national resources, this model was very prof-
itable for individual persons and generally for the top social groups formed mostly in Soviet 
times. 
As a result, by the second half of the 1990ies a certain ‘negative equilibrium’ had been created 
in the Russian society and, despite the inefficiency of the existing system, there were no influen-
tial economic or political actors interested in its transformation. The stability of such a ‘negative 
equilibrium’ even generated some pessimistic hypotheses about a ‘stationary transitional’ condi-
tion of the contemporary Russian economy.67 
Along with all that, the economic system, which in its formal part consumed more resources 
than the value produced and which operated at the cost of net debt only,68 could not exist for a 
long period of time. Sooner or later it was to come to an end, which happened in August 1998. 
Above all, it was even possible to expect that such a system crisis would have resulted in sub-
stantial changes in the elite and emergence of new influential players. 
But this did not happen: in spite of certain shifts inside the Russian elite, its present top repre-
sentatives were already at power at that time and on the eve of the crisis. In fact it is possible to 
talk about a mere ‘removal’ of some figures of the Yeltsin era and the promotion of certain 
players of the second echelon to the first rows.69 Therefore, we can talk about appearance of 
new persons and, at the same time, about new interests. 
                                                     
65 Hellman (1998), Hellman et al (2000). 
66 See Yakovlev (1993), Radaev (1998).  
67 For more details see Kapelushnikov (2001).  
68 See Gaddy & Ickes (1998), Yakovlev (1999), Ericson & Ickes (2000). 
69 Here it is worth mentioning S.M. Ignatiev, M.M. Kasianov, A.A. Kudrin and I.S. Ivanov who, several years before 
the crisis, held offices of deputies and first deputies at federal ministers. We can also mention Vladimir Putin, who in 
July 1998 became FSB Director with the rank of federal minister, and German Gref, who in 1997 was Vice-governor 
of St. Petersburg and Head of the State Property Management Committee. 
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A change of interests on the side of the business was related to the end of large-scale privatiza-
tion and the beginning of a post-privatization property redistribution (the Law on Bankruptcy of 
1998 was very actively applied for such purposes). Such a trend was not directly related to the 
crisis and only coincided with it in time. However, the incentives for property redistribution 
were strengthened by the effect of devaluation, which increased the profitability of Russian 
companies and raised the value of their assets. As a result, business started to realize that it 
really possessed property (not just control over cash flows) and if it followed a very short-
sighted policy only aimed at withdrawing liquid assets, it could lose both. Such a situation re-
sulted in a substantial extension of the time horizon of business interests. 
At the same time, the crisis provided an impetus for self-organization of business in order to 
influence its environment. More and more representatives of the business circles realized that 
even absolutely successful business independent of the state could crash if the system of rela-
tions in the society is not changed. A fact that serves to illustrate this point is the creation of the 
Club 2015 at the end of 1998 and the active work of this association in 1999–2000 in the “Sce-
narios for Russia” project.70 
On the part of the state, the change of interests was related to a revaluation of the situation by 
the political elite and new bureaucracy, which had benefited from the reforms of the 1990ies. 
These groups began to realize the necessity of consolidation of power and strengthening of the 
state in order to turn the anarchy and chaos of the previous decade into a kind of ‘order’, be-
cause there was a real possibility that the next crisis similar to that of August 1998 would lead 
to the ousting of the political elite. Such strengthening of the state required streamlining the 
budgeting process, changing the relationships between the federal centre and the regions, as 
well as a ‘longer-sighted’ view at economic and social development. 
On the whole, the 1998 crisis had a cold shower effect on the Russian elite. The crisis hit not so 
much the top tier but the middle class in big cities.71 Nevertheless, the crisis became the mile-
stone that made the elite realize it could lose its property or status (there were several examples 
of this in politics and business). Such an extended horizon of interests along with the under-
standing of the system risks became a basis for the drafting of a new reform program (the well-
known ‘Gref Program’) as well as for a search for new values and variants of the ‘social con-
tract’ which had not been even mentioned since the beginning of the 1990ies. 
Alongside the change of interests both on the side of business and on the side of the state there 
were, in our opinion, certain shifts in the composition of the elite. The crisis did not result in its 
radical renewal, but, as we already said earlier, it enabled a number of players, who occupied 
less important positions, to come forward. In 1999–2000 the place of the former ‘oligarchs’ was 
taken in several cases by second echelon companies which, having no access to the budget sine-
cures, had to invest more in the development of their business, in restructuring of assets and 
penetration into new markets. Exactly this kind of business turned out to be more competitive 
during the crisis and received a strong impetus for development in 1999–2000. 
Similar trends were observed to a certain extent in the government. After the crisis, a wide range 
of young mid-level officials advanced their careers. In many cases they were more professional 
than their predecessors but did not have prospects of fast advance under the old system, because 
                                                     
70 For more details see the web site of the Club <www.club2015.ru>. The difference of Club 2015 from other public 
associations which became more active at this period (like the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy) was that it 
was composed mostly of businessmen and managers not involved directly in political activities. Unlike business 
associations, Club 2015 did not directly lobby the interests of any branches of economy or business groups. 
71 However, here it is necessary to stress that the term ‘middle class’ as applied to the Russian reality needs to be 
clarified. There are studies of Tatyana Maleva and her colleagues supported by Bureau of Economic Analysis and 
Carnegie Foundation on this subject (see Avraamova 2000 and Avraamova 2003). That is why we shall only note, 
without going into a detailed discussion, that according to Pappe, the 1998 crisis enabled some of the traditional 
groups of Soviet intelligentsia to return to the middle class (at least to its lower tiers). 
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it was based not on the evaluation and recognition of personal achievements, but rather on close 
informal interrelations between governmental bodies and business. Not bound by the old system 
of relations, which imposed rather strict obligations upon its members, such public officials 
were more willing to be guided by their own long-term career interests. Thereby they were more 
willing to promote public interests not only by words but by deeds. Above all, having real com-
petitive advantages, such officials were generally interested in more transparent and competitive 
‘rules of the game’ inside the governmental establishment during the crisis and in the period 
immediately after the crisis, because this could advance their careers further. 
As a result, several trends coincided by the end of 1999–2000. The ‘cleaning of the field’ for 
more efficient business players along with the devaluation effects served as a prerequisite for 
post-crisis economic growth. By the time of the parliamentary and presidential elections such 
economic growth had already brought about a real increase of household incomes, primarily in 
the regions. At the same time, the extension of the horizon of interests, both in business and in 
the government, was manifest in the readiness to play by the rules instead of with the rules, 
which was typical of the 1990ies. On top of that, a new young president appeared on the scene, 
who not only started to voice the ‘super power’ aspirations of the electorate but also initiated, 
for the first time in a decade, a long-term program of social and economic development.72 
A combination of such trends for the first time since 1991 produced an upsurge of positive ex-
pectations in society. In particular, in the period from September 1999 till May 2000 the ‘social 
attitude index’ (ISN) calculated by VTsIOM increased almost 1.5 times and for the first time 
exceeded the 100-point level. But after a rather long period of stability,73 the ISN started to de-
crease from May 2002 slowly but steadily. Such a trend, in our opinion, reflects the common 
feeling of a new slowdown of social and economic development which is manifest not only in 
the deceleration of economic growth rates. In the next paragraph we will try to look into the 
reasons for such ‘stagnation’. 
New deceleration and its reasons 
In addition to decreasing living standards, skyrocketing inflation, devaluation and default, the 
1998 crisis discredited in the minds of the people those neoliberal values and approaches which 
determined the policy of the 1990ies (to the extent it was consistent). The neoliberal doctrine in 
Russia in the 1990ies to a certain degree was the official ideology in the field of economic pol-
icy. A failure of this policy resulted in an ideological crisis inside the ruling elite and compelled 
it to search for new approaches. 
Such a situation in autumn 1998 – spring 1999 gave birth to a demand for new ideas on the part 
of the government structures, while there was a dearth of such ideas in the expert and analyst 
community. In that period one of the key platforms where the process of elaboration and discus-
sion of such ideas took place was the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP) close to 
Evgeny Primakov. The SVOP was the first place for public expert discussions between repre-
sentatives of very different elite groups – from Kakha Bendukidze and Irina Khakamada to Ser-
gei Glaziev. However, the nature of the discussions remained informal. Despite Primakov’s 
presence at several SVOP meetings, the government did not participate directly in the dialogue. 
When Vladimir Putin came to power, further advances were made in this direction. In order to 
elaborate the long-term program of social and economic development declared by Putin, the 
                                                     
72 Before that, all government programs starting with the famous “500 days” program had a horizon of no more than 
two years. It increased investment risks, because implementation of large business projects requires much more time, 
and political uncertainty grows dramatically over a time period of two years. 
73 The only considerable fall of ISN at that time was observed at the end of the summer (sinking of the Kursk atomic 
submarine and fire in Ostankino TV-tower). 
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Centre for Strategic Research (CSR) was set up. From the very beginning it was headed by 
German Gref, who became Minister of Economic Development and Trade in May 2000. Repre-
sentatives of leading research and analytical centres were officially invited to participate in ac-
tivities of CSR. On the basis of the reports presented by them a series of public seminars was 
held at CSR in February–March 2000 devoted to a wide range of questions – from moderniza-
tion of the economy to public administration reform and formation of a new social contract. 
The scope of this paper does not permit an analysis of the contents of such discussions (al-
though it would certainly be of interest from the point of view of studying the public thinking in 
modern Russia). Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize the fact that the government initiated 
a public expert discussion of strategic problems of national development and made attempts to 
listen to alternative points of view. It is noteworthy that representatives of the business commu-
nity (in particular, members of Club 2015) also took an active part in the discussion. 
We believe this dialogue could have become a turning point for the formation of ‘a consensus 
for the sake of reforms’ which was shaped in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 
the beginning of the 1990ies and which, in the opinion of many experts, became the key factor 
for their successful transformation.74 For this purpose, however, the process should have passed 
from the expert to the political level, but this did not happen. 
The reason for the end of the process, as we think, lies in the technocratic ideas of social and 
economic management, which continue to dominate in the Russian political and governmental 
circles. In accordance with such ideas, the state had listened to potential stakeholders and after 
that made itself an arbitrary decision about where to go and what to do. 
However, in order to implement the decisions made it was necessary to reinforce the positions 
of the state and, first of all, of the federal centre. It was with this purpose that the strengthening 
of the ‘vertical line of power’ was initiated by President Putin in 2000. It led to the noticeable 
limitation of the governors’ powers, reform of the Federation Council, creation of federal dis-
tricts headed by president’s representatives, etc. The result of such measures was a real 
strengthening of the federal government’s position. But we think that the bureaucratic estab-
lishment has strengthened and consolidated even more, which nullifies all the positive results of 
this policy. In order to clear up this point of view it is necessary to make an excursion to the 
spheres related to correlation of public, state and corporate (or group) interests. 
As was shown by Mansur Olson in his “Logic of Collective Actions”, public interests do not 
exist by themselves and do not have a specific carrier. They are realized through political com-
petition, which is a conflict of different group or corporate interests in the political market. In 
our opinion, however, it is necessary to differentiate considerably depending on the existence 
and level of the development of democracy. In particular, we can talk about a developed or un-
stable democracy, as well as about non-democratic regimes. 
A developed democracy acts as a tool to maintain constant public political competition. It pro-
vides the society with controls over the actions of the government and offers an opportunity and 
legal procedures to change the government, if its actions do not correspond with the interests of 
society. In this process a developed democracy can maintain a relative balance of group and 
corporate interests through systematic identification of public interests. 
However, in a weak and unstable democracy political competition basically acts as non-public, 
internal struggle of the elite groups for power. This certainly assumes the possibility of subse-
quent use of power to suppress political opponents. 
Finally, in the absence of democracy (which has been historically typical for Russia), political 
competition acquires, to our mind, the nature of a permanent conflict between the state interests 
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and the interests of separate elite groups. Such a conflict is preconditioned by the ‘state nature’ 
of the society, by a different, much bigger, role of the state in all social and economic processes. 
The state declares itself as representative of the interests of society75 and all other interests are 
overridden by the interests of the state. 
The carriers of such state interests are the top representatives of government structures. How-
ever, for practical implementation of the state interests shaped by the government, it needs sup-
port from a certain social class. As shown by Pivovarov and Fursov,76 this role was played in 
different periods of the Russian history by the Oprichniks, serving noblemen, officialdom of the 
middle and end of the 19th century, and the Soviet nomenklatura. What they all have in common 
is that representatives of these social groups were serving the state and can generally be defined 
as a ‘service class’.77 However, every time such a class expanded and gained influence it began 
promoting its own corporate interests which did not correspond to the interests of the state and, 
therefore, undermined its basis. 
As a result, political competition in Russia can be likened to the swing of a pendulum between 
two extremes. At one end, there was the consolidation of the state and concentration of govern-
ment efforts on a promotion of the ‘state interests’ while oppressing the interests of other social 
groups. At the other end, there was the absolute domination of group or corporate interests of 
the ‘service class’ to the detriment of the interests of the state. 
During the period of movement from one pole to the other, a relative balance between the inter-
ests of the state and the ‘service class’ may be reached favouring, in particular, partial realiza-
tion of public interests which are ignored at extreme points. But the problem is that such ‘inter-
mediary’ states are not stable. The logic of the system always pushes it to one of the poles, and 
after recurrent growth of inefficiency the systems falls again into a deep crisis. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is a vivid example of one such crisis, the basic reason 
for which was the transformation of the Soviet nomenklatura into a self-sufficient force and 
transformation of the state into a combination of institutional interests that interacted based on 
‘administrative trade’ principles.78 In the 1990ies this structure was generally reproduced under 
the guise of a market economy and with adjustments for the considerably increased independ-
ence of the regional elite and the emergence of the business elite. 
In this context Putin’s policy can be perceived as the backward swing of the ‘pendulum’.79 
However, at present Russian society is in transition from a non-democratic regime to an unsta-
ble democracy. Besides, we are living in a more open society. Under such circumstances the 
possibilities of direct control of the state over the actions of its ‘service class’ turn out to be very 
limited. 
It is for this reason that the technocratic choice in favour of ‘strengthening of the vertical line of 
power’ without creating the prerequisites for development of democratic institutions has so far 
benefited mainly the consolidation of the corporate interests of the ‘service class’ (currently 
represented by the federal bureaucracy) and strengthening of its positions as opposed to regional 
authorities and big business. Besides, the group or corporate interests of the ‘service class’ are 
more and more associated with the interests of the federal ministries, the activities of which in 
fact remain outside the control of society. 
                                                     
75 It is evident that even in the ideal case of an ‘enlightened and just monarch’ such a structure means absolutization 
of one point of view, i.e. the idea of public interests typical of the people who are located at the top of the power 
hierarchy at that moment. 
76 See. Yu. Pivovarov, A. Fursov (1999) etc. 
77 The term ‘service class’ was suggested by K. Renner and further developed in Goldthorpe, 1995. 
78 Kordonski (2000). See also <http://www.libertarium.ru/libertarium/l_knig_knig> 
79 In particular, Yu. Zudin (2003) writes about the ‘monocentrism’ of Putin’s rule in comparison with the ‘polycen-
trism’ of the Yeltsin regime. 
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The state’s consolidation policy has helped governmental agencies as well as corporations of 
state officials to better understand their own interests and possibilities, which in practice signifi-
cantly exceed the possibilities of any individual representative of the bureaucratic establishment. 
For illustration see Table 3, which characterizes the evolution of interaction between govern-
ment and business depending on the level of its consolidation and the extent to which it is con-
trolled by the society. 
Table 3: Government and Business Interaction Model 
Not consolidated Consolidated Governmental agency 
1 2 
Not really controlled 
by society 
А Individual public officials 
play for the benefit of indi-
vidual market players 
(situation in Russia of the 
1990ies) 
1) Agency plays for the benefit of 
individual players, or 
2) Agency plays for its own benefits, 
bringing market players under its control 
(in general typical of the last 3–4 years) 
Controlled by 
society 
В - Open political competition restricts 
negative extremes of standard bureau-
cratic aspirations and therefore directs 
the activities of governmental agencies 
to promotion of social interests 
 
In contrast to the 1990ies the majority of Russian government agencies are at present located in 
the A2 square. Besides, we can observe a gradual transition from the game for the benefit of 
separate businesses to subordination of such businesses for the purposes of internal bureaucratic 
interests. This happens because a consolidated agency able to substantially influence the rules of 
the game in a specific market is stronger than any other, however big, player in the same mar-
ket. To a certain extent the model of state capture by business is being replaced by the model of 
informal ‘subordination of business to the state’, which is no more efficient than state capture.80 
In this regard it is also possible to talk about the use of expanded opportunities of the state for 
direct capture of business by state officials. Such a strategy, however, may come into conflict 
with corporate interests of government agencies. The latter are likely to aim at ensuring general 
control over the markets assigned to their competence, which creates possibilities for all the 
representatives of the agency to obtain rent in accordance with their ranks in the institutional 
hierarchy. 
An indirect confirmation of the growing activity of state institutions and abandonment of the 
‘privatization of the state’ model may be found in the statistical data of the Supreme Arbitration 
Court, according to which the 100% growth of the number of claims submitted to court in the 
period between 1997 and 2001 mainly resulted from the rapid increase of administrative 
claims.81 The state capture hypothesis for post-crisis Russia finds no confirmation in the empiric 
data given in one of the latest works by Frye.82 The results of his research based on the survey 
of 500 managers of enterprises in six regions at the end of 2000 are more likely to confirm the 
existence of a system of mutual ‘exchanges’ between the state and business structures close to 
the state. 
                                                     
80 The extreme examples of this kind of policy may be the use of tax arrears of private companies in potentially at-
tractive branches of the economy for direct transformation of these companies into state enterprises (see 
Kryshtanovskaya, 2002a). 
81 For more details see Karev (2003).  
82 Frye (2002b).  
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It is evident that the ‘pressure groups’ lobbying certain business interests can undoubtedly influ-
ence a specific state institution. But efficiency of such influence will substantially depend on the 
degree of agencies’ consolidation. The higher the degree of such consolidation, the higher the 
costs of passing the ‘required’ decision through the agency, and therefore, the higher the possi-
bility that the agency will aim at the implementation of its own internal bureaucratic interests, 
assigning the corresponding costs to business and society. 
Such a strengthening of the bureaucratic establishment and oppression of business activities 
could not but provoke a counter-reaction of business. This was manifest in the development of 
horizontal concentration and vertical integration and in the formation of very large holdings 
comprising enterprises of different industries. Such large holdings are able to ‘balance’ separate 
consolidated ministries which compete for authority and control over resources. Such an econ-
omy is characterized by a shrinking space for competition in the internal market, which is mani-
fests itself, among other things, in the stagnation of small and medium-size business. 
However, there were some other factors on the side of business that hindered further develop-
ment. As we have already said, the economic dynamics of 1999–2000 were ensured to a great 
extent by the successful advance of more efficient players of the former ‘second echelon’. How-
ever, the economic structure in general has not become more competitive. New institutions and 
tools supporting competitiveness and stimulating new ideas and technologies have not appeared. 
Moreover, the pressure of competition in some sectors has possibly even become weaker be-
cause of the impact of devaluation which restricted access of imported goods to the Russian 
market. As a result, having gained positions in the ‘first echelon’, the new players are now in-
terested in preserving the existing and creating additional non-market barriers, protecting them 
against potential competitors. With this purpose in view, the same ‘games with the rules’ can be 
used, the only difference being that now the relevant decisions are adopted at a higher level and 
consume more resources.  
To sum up, we can say that although the horizon of interests has extended, the dialogue between 
the key stakeholders has not come into being, and the big business and the state have not real-
ised a common understanding of the future social and economic development of the country. In 
addition, the state in general does not trust business and tries to override it by imposing its own 
policy. However, in practice the result is that governmental reformers who are not incorporated 
into the system of receiving the ‘status rent’ sink deeper and deeper in the flood of the reforms 
initiated by them. In this process the governmental establishment is adapting to the new condi-
tions and is gradually converting such transformations into ‘reforms for the sake of reforms’ 
which create new sources for obtaining rent. Business realises this and distrusts the state in its 
turn and therefore does not have sufficient competition incentives for development. 
As a result, all the influential players prefer to wait,83 and not take the risk of investments into 
long-term political or business projects. The situation in the oil market, favourable for Russia, 
reinforces such a tendency even further. Thus, development is continuing at an extremely slow 
pace under the ‘Fairy-Tale of Lost Time’ scenario, which was predicted by Club 2015 as early 
as 1999 as one of three most probable development scenarios in Russia for the next decade.84 
According to this scenario, after ten years of such slow development Russia will find itself yet 
again on the brink of a profound social and economic crisis. This pessimistic forecast corre-
sponds on the whole to E. Kuznetsov’s opinion, who worked for a long time at the World Bank 
as an expert on Latin America, that Russia during recent years resembles Argentina during 
1995–1996. 
                                                     
83 Such a situation was called a ‘waiting trap’ in E. Kuznetsov’s paper (2002).  
84 For more details about the project ”Scenarios for Russia” please refer to <www.club2015.ru> 
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Instead of a conclusion: preliminary results 
As compared with other former socialist countries, the Soviet Union and Russia are the coun-
tries with the longest experience of a command-line economy and a one-party political system. 
This resulted in deep institutional transformations because competition was consistently eradi-
cated from all economic and social spheres for 70 years. In the economy, this was manifested in 
the ‘one factory’ model and in the struggle against ‘parallelism and duplication’. In the social 
sphere, the fight against free-thinking either resulted in physical elimination of the potential 
opposition or caused this opposition to emigrate or be assimilated. 
As a result of this policy, reflecting the logic of the system, incentives to development were 
continuously eliminated and innovation was fading away. Living on rent was gradually becom-
ing a dominant strategy. Ultimately, there was a decline in efficiency and stagnation. It is these 
factors that caused the Soviet Union and its allies to lose their global fight against capitalism.  
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and implementation of market mechanisms did not 
change the situation. Introducing market features to the economy that had been functioning 
along the ‘one factory’ principle for decades only generated acute monopoly effects. In politics, 
the lack of a real counter-elite enabled representatives of the younger generation of old elite 
groups (party nomenklatura and top tiers of the intelligentsia close to the government) to take 
advantage of the collapse of the regime and to promote their own interests. 
The traditional incentive and motivation system used by these groups would stimulate reproduc-
tion of new uncompetitive structures in the economy and in politics and would encourage the 
elite to try and obtain rent on a even bigger scale. The elimination of checks and balances limit-
ing such patterns of behaviour within the framework of the administrative system as well as the 
arbitration opportunities that arose between the market and regulated sectors of the economy 
during the reforms also played a role in this process. 
The possibility of rent-seeking on a systematic basis within the framework of such arbitration 
transactions encouraged the elite to solidify and prolong that situation, which generated the ‘par-
tial reform’ policy as described by Hellman. The arbitration opportunities were much better in 
Russia and CIS countries than in other economies in transition because the scale of structural 
distortion accumulated earlier was larger, too. Therefore, the potential benefits grew and incen-
tives to retain the economy and society in the ‘partial reform’ trap were becoming more and 
more powerful.  
However, the new system turned out to be even more inefficient when compared to the old one. 
The society was living on rent, as before, while the distribution of the rent became extremely 
disproportional. The main rent volumes were concentrated in the hands of a limited number of 
people, while most people’s living standards were stagnating or even falling dramatically. This 
increasing injustice in revenue distribution can, in our opinion, explain the appearance and im-
portance of the phenomenon that Frye calls ‘political polarization’. 
The growing inefficiency of the system and the fact that influential players (both in business and 
in the government) were not interested in finding a way out of the existing ‘negative equilib-
rium’ made a crisis (similar to the one that took place in August 1998) inevitable.  
On the face of it, this crisis did not result in a dramatic transformation of the business and politi-
cal elite. We believe, however, that it had a significant impact on the motivation of the existing 
agents, especially in 1999–2000. A major difference from the early 1990ies was that representa-
tives of the existing business elite already had significant assets and had, therefore, something to 
lose. The crisis that brought the left-centrist Primakov government to power also revealed a 
potential threat to representatives of the Yeltsin political elite, namely, a loss of their social 
status should the crisis repeat itself in a more acute form.  
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As a result, both business and government extended their horizons of interests and, therefore, 
more willingness to ‘play by the rules’ – as contrasted with the systematic ‘games with the 
rules’ characteristic of the 1990ies. At the same time, the devaluation effect triggered economic 
growth which in 1999–2000 for the first time in many years resulted in a visible increase in 
living standards, especially in the Russian regions. Furthermore, the appearance on the political 
scene of a young president who started his presidency by developing a long-term social and 
economic development program generated a surge of positive expectations in the society in 
spring 2000. 
Now, three years later, despite the continuing (although at a slower pace) economic growth and 
social stability, one can state that most of these expectations have not been met. One might feel 
that what we see in Russia at the moment is the restoration – although in more ‘market-oriented’ 
and ‘democratic’ forms – of the hierarchical system that was characteristic of the Soviet era and 
that would extinguish all incentives to change which did not originate at the centre or did not 
comply with its policy.  
In our view, this can be explained by the fact that although some new players appeared on the 
scene after the 1991 and 1998 crises, the environment in general did not undergo any significant 
transformations. It has been and continues to be uncompetitive – both in the economy and in 
politics. The crises cleared out the field and promoted new, more active and energetic players to 
the frontline. As they strengthened their positions, however, they lost incentives for develop-
ment and innovation.85 But since the economic and political environments remain uncompeti-
tive, these players, once they have taken dominant positions, can extract rent from their ‘status’ 
or market share; they can deny access to resources to their potential competitors; or they can 
even block the reforms that could break the existing equilibrium. 
It must be stressed that trying to obtain rent is generally natural for market agents. Rent is nor-
mally associated with monopoly. We believe, however, that a difference should be made be-
tween innovative and political rent. 
In a competitive market, the environment makes market agents search for ways to reduce costs 
or to find new market niches thus encouraging them to be innovative. As long as these innova-
tions are not copied by other market players their initiators can expect to receive an innovation 
rent. The innovations in question are not only technological but also organizational and manage-
rial. Studies show that such innovations are closely related to accumulation of specialized 
knowledge and are possible in any sector and at different stages of global value chains.86  
The phenomenon of ‘Political rent’, on the other hand, appears when one market player can use 
his connections in the government to influence the regulatory system, artificially limit access to 
markets for new players, and obtain resources that do not match his performance. 
It is obvious that a prevalence of such strategies at the micro level results in a general decline in 
efficiency on the macro level thus making the next crisis unavoidable. And although this new 
crisis can provide new opportunities for promoting new, more efficient players, the odds are the 
system will ultimately return to the state of ‘negative equilibrium’ if the structure of relation-
ships does not change as new players appear on the scene, if competition and innovation-
oriented institutions and mechanisms are not put in place.   
That competition is important for economic and social development is not a new thing. The 
question is where competition will come from. It was typical of Russian reformists and their 
                                                     
85 It must be pointed out here that we are talking about the general trend which can be expressed in different ways on 
different marketplaces. It is most visible in commodity industries. On the other hand, companies from the food or 
mechanical industries in the post-crisis period face competition from foreign producers and this causes them to be 
innovative. 
86 See, e.g., Kaplinsky (2000). 
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Western advisors of the early 1990ies to believe that competition would be introduced together 
with market mechanisms and democratic institutions. These expectations did not come true. A 
loose coupling of an imperfect market and a weak, corrupt state extinguished the sparks of re-
forms coming from the top, the reforms stalled, and the reformists themselves either fitted in the 
existing system of relationships or disappeared from the political arena. It should be pointed out 
that all this is not new either. Many third world countries have been in the state of ‘negative 
equilibrium’ for decades. 
In our view, the way out of this weak market/inefficient state trap is not revolutionary transfor-
mation under large-scale reforms but gradual introduction and incorporation of mechanisms and 
institutions that would stimulate innovations in the continuing uncompetitive environment. Dis-
semination of innovation and involvement of new economic agents in innovative activities 
would help create interest groups that would actually support competition.  
An example of such mechanisms used to stimulate innovation is the Chile Foundation, which 
was created in the mid-1970ies under a match funding scheme between the Government of 
Chile and ITT Corporation. The activities of this Foundation in the 1980–90ies encouraged a 
dramatic growth in Chilean exports – artificially bred salmon, tomato paste, table grapes, and 
other products.87 Other examples include associations of producers initiated by business people 
in depressed regions of South Italy and North East Brazil that managed, with support of the 
local authorities, to significantly improve quality, expand production, and increase exports.88  
Using traditional terminology, we can talk about mechanisms and instruments of industrial or 
structural policy. They do not fit in standard schemes, however, because they assume close in-
teraction between government and business and often do not have any strict formal limits. In 
our opinion, it is more correct to speak about institutional innovations that create conditions for 
the appearance and dissemination of technological and organizational/managerial innovations 
when market competition is insufficient. 
What could be the fulcrum for the implementation of such institutions and mechanisms? 
In business, in politics, and in the state machinery there is always ‘the second echelon’. Its play-
ers can perform better than the leaders but it is difficult for them to move forward. As the sys-
tem is progressively consolidated and cemented, it becomes more difficult for them to develop 
and they face bigger hurdles and barriers. Such companies on the marketplace and such players 
on the side of the state (not only in the state machinery but also in the political sphere) can sup-
port efforts to put new institutions in place. But they can hardly initiate this process since they 
do not have enough influence to do that. 
The problem is that with the current balance of power the ‘first echelon’ players do not need 
institutions and mechanisms of competition. They already have dominating positions and their 
rational strategy of behaviour comes down to using the existing opportunities to obtain ‘political 
rent’. To each rule, however, there are exceptions; and ‘the first echelon’, too, has atypical play-
ers oriented towards long-term development. 
Their distinct feature is that they do not just want to retain what they already have (capital, their 
position on the market, their social status), they want something more. They act irrationally; 
from the perspective of dominating strategies of behaviour; their interests can collide. And yet, 
it is they who can initiate institutional innovation and kick off the process. In our opinion, how-
ever, they can be successful only under certain conditions.89  
                                                     
87 For more information see Kuznetsov (2002). 
88 See Locke (2001). 
89 When identifying these conditions we use the results of Russian studies by E. Kuznetsov (2002), A. Ponomarev, 
and K. Gonchar (2002) as well as Richard Locke’s paper on building institutions of trust in South Italy and North 
Brazil (see Locke, 2001). 
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The first hurdle they will need to overcome is gaining minimum critical mass. Since we are 
talking about atypical players, their group will by definition be very small; and the better the 
interaction among the players, the better their chances of success. This interaction should in-
volve both business and government. Since the market and the state are both weak, cooperation 
on just one side is unlikely to bring about the expected results. Moreover, this cooperation 
should reflect the specific interests of the potential stakeholders and should, therefore, be aimed 
at implementing certain projects rather than create institutions as such. To avoid possible mim-
icry and search for rent in such projects, they should from the very beginning be based on long-
term and common interests of the potential stakeholders.  
The second hurdle has to do with lack of trust among potential players and with their sustain-
able negative expectations generated by their previous experience of the 1990s. The abovesaid 
is true both for possible first movers represented by atypical players of ‘the first echelon’ and 
for more numerous efficient players of ‘the second echelon’ who have less resources and do not 
believe that something can be changed in real life.  
In the case of first movers, as we can see from the few successful projects of cooperation be-
tween business and government implemented in Russia in the 1990ies,90 to establish trust 
among the potential participants it is better not to make project implementation conditions too 
formal at the initial stages of the projects. If, however, the projects are successful, the conditions 
need to be formalized so that they can be replicated and disseminated in the future.  
The last step is very important for the demonstration effect because negative and pessimistic 
expectations of the ‘second echelon’ players can be overturned with a series of successful joint 
projects proving the possibility of cooperation between interested market and state actors. Best 
practice identification and dissemination mechanisms can be used for the same purposes (e.g. 
contests of already implemented projects, ‘company of the year’-type of contests, etc.).91  
The third hurdle is likely to be expressed in an active opposition of the environment. The point 
is that stable interest groups have been formed around the existing inefficient institutions. These 
groups include both businessmen and officials. Because of these institutions and because some 
players have better access to them these players can obtain political rent. This is why they are 
going to hinder any reform of such institutions or turn this process into ‘partial reforms’. This is, 
in our view, the reason behind the systematic ‘slipping’ of institutional reforms in Russia.  
In order to weaken this opposition of the environment, the reform vector needs to be changed, in 
our opinion. Instead of changing and breaking the existing institutions we need to emphasize the 
need to create new institutions. It is better to launch such institutions (or projects they are based 
on) in the sectors where the drawbacks and inefficiency of the old institutions are most visible. 
However, it is better to do this as a series of experiments or pilot projects because this gives you 
the ability to keep the old institutions which can at least function, albeit badly. 
This approach, in our opinion, will not only weaken the opposition of the existing interest 
groups but will also create conditions for competition of institutions. The experience with the 
practical functioning of such somewhat parallel institutions will provide grounds for redistribut-
ing resources in favour of the most efficient ones in the future and, thus, for building new inter-
est groups around them to strengthen those institutions.92 It is important, however, to understand 
                                                     
90 See Ponomarev, Gonchar (2002). 
91 E. Kuznetsov (2002) in his paper describes a successful implementation of such a contest mechanism in Mexico 
that helped develop elements of competition among the regions (states). We believe certain analogies can be offered 
here with the ‘socialist competition’ mechanism which created certain incentives to innovation and improved per-
formance in the uncompetitive command-line Soviet economy in the 1930–60ies. 
92 We believe, something similar took place in China in the 1980–90ies when the so-called town-village enterprises – 
TVE – emerged. The rapid growth of those enterprises belonging to local authorities took place against the back-
ground of very slow transformations in the state-owned industry. At the end of the day, TVEs turned out to be a very 
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that not all institutional innovations prove effective. An evolutionary approach based on compe-
tition of institutions can soften the impacts of unsuccessful experiments. 
Our last comment will be about the concepts of ‘first’ and ‘second echelons’. These concepts 
are very important for us but we should stress their relativity. One and the same company can be 
the top leader in its region and, at the same time, a minor player on the national marketplace. An 
energetic governor who has his own political ambitions can be lost at the federal level. 
In our view, institutional innovation providing more room for competition is more likely to be 
initiated at the regional level because of a greater variety of initial conditions and potentially 
higher ambitions of the regional elite. Projects with the biggest potential could be the ones 
aimed at establishing cooperation between strong regional leaders and large business structures 
operating on the national marketplace. As opposed to many federal policy-makers and high-
ranking officials, the relative advantage of regional leaders is that they still have room for ad-
vancement. The main advantage of national level business structures could be a larger pool of 
resources and a broader horizon of interests.    
The main target of the policy of creating institutions in an imperfect institutional environment 
should, therefore, be the search for ‘exceptions to the rules’ among the ‘first echelon’ players 
both in business and in government, and to gain their cooperation. At the initial stage this coop-
eration should be relatively informal and take the shape of specific projects rather than be fo-
cused on creating new institutions as such. At the next stage, stable negative expectations in 
business and society will need to be broken to secure and extend support for the new institu-
tions. This can be done using the demonstration effect of a series of successful joint projects 
proving the possibility of cooperation among interested players in business and in the state ma-
chinery. And finally, to contain the opposition of the environment and ensure a relative stability 
for the entire system, it is better to aim not at a destruction or dramatic transformation of the 
existing institutions (something that Russian reformists have traditionally focused on) but at a 
system of experiments aimed to create parallel institutions. This would provide for institutional 
innovation and encourage competition among the institutions. Support groups would form 
around the most efficient institutions with subsequent gradual redistribution of resources in fa-
vour of those institutions. 
Obviously, the above is not an answer to the question HOW to implement reform. These are just 
some approaches that can be used to create positive incentives and motivation for potential re-
form supporters represented by atypical players of the ‘first echelon’ and more numerous effi-
cient players of the ‘second’ echelon. In our next papers, however, we will use more detailed 
analysis of mechanisms of economic growth stimulation and transformation of market institu-
tions in Russia in the conditions of globalization to try and provide a more complete answer to 
the question HOW because it is this question that is the key to successful economic and political 
reform. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
good example of institutional innovation, which did not, however, fit well into the standard framework of economic 
theory. 
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